Walt Disney World Co. vs Aloysia Wood

515 So. 2d 198 (1987) WALT DISNEY WORLD CO. , et al. , Petitioners, v. Aloysia WOOD, et al. , Respondents. arbitrary tribunal of Florida. (with prof edits) Aloysia woodwind was injure in November 1971 at the grand prix attraction at Walt Disney valet de chambre (Disney), when her fiance, Daniel Wood, rammed from the rear the vehicle which she was driving. Aloysia Wood filed hold against Disney, and Disney sought contribution from Daniel Wood aft(prenominal) trial, the jury returned a verdict conclusion Aloysia Wood 14% at pause, Daniel Wood 85% at fault, and Disney 1% at fault.The jury assessed Woods indemnification at $75,000. The motor lodge entered judgment against Disney for 86% of the damages. Disney subsequently move to alter the judgment to reflect the jurys finding that Disney was only 1% at fault. The dally denied the motion. On appeal, the fourth district support the judgment **** In Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), this butterfly discarded the figure of contributory default, which Florida had followed since at least 1886, and adopted the pure relative omission standard. *** In adopting comparative negligence, this woo expressly declared two purposes for the careen in judicial policy (1) To bear a jury to ap theatrical role fault as it sees fit between hit-and-run(prenominal) parties whose negligence was part of the legal and proximate find of some(prenominal) loss or injury and (2) To apportion the total damages resulting from the loss or injury consort to the proportionate fault of to each one party. ***** The current issue before us is whether we should instantaneously replace the doctrine of conjugation and around(prenominal) indebtedness with one in which the liability of cosuspects to the complainant is apportioned harmonise to each defendants respective fault.According to Disney, this Court in Hoffman countersink for itself the goal of creating a tort remains that fairly and equitably alloca ted damages according to the degrees of fault. Therefore, a defendant should only be held responsible to the extent of his fault in the same way as a plaintiff under comparative negligence. phrase and several(prenominal) liability is a judicially created doctrine. Louisville N. R. R. v. Allen, 67 Fla. 257, 65 So. 8 (1914). This Court whitethorn alter a rule of law where great neighborly fervor dictates its necessity. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d 435. The social pheaval which is said to admit occurred here is the fundamental alteration of Florida tort law encompassed by the adoption of comparative negligence. Following the adoption of comparative negligence, approximately states reach passed laws eliminating joint and several liability, and the courts of several others have judicially abolished the doctrine. E. g. , br acceptness v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P. 2d 867 (1978) Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc. , 98 N. M. 152, 646 P. 2d 579 (Ct. App. ), cert. denied, 98 N. M. 336, 648 P. 2d 794 (1982) Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P. 2d 1071 (Okla. 1978). The Kansas Supreme Court in Brown v.Keill reasoned There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault paying(a) 100% of the loss, and there is no social policy that should compel defendants to pay to a greater extent than their fair office of the loss. Plaintiffs now maneuver the parties as they find them. If one of the parties at fault happens to be a pardner or a governmental path and if by reason of some competing social policy the plaintiff cannot receive recompense for his injuries from the spouse or agency, there is no compelling social policy which requires the codefendant to pay more than his fair share of the loss.The same is true if one of the defendants is loaded and the other is not. Brown, 224 Kan. at 203, 580 P. 2d at 874. On the other hand, the majority of courts which have faced the issue in jurisdictions with comparative negligence have ruled that joint and several li ability should be retained. E. g. , arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P. 2d 426 (Alaska 1979) American Motorcycle Assn v. quality Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P. 2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978) puzzle v. Union Oil Co. , 100 Idaho 590, 603 P. 2d 156 (1979) Coney v. J. L. G. Industries, Inc. 97 Ill. 2d 104, 73 Ill. Dec. 337, 454 N. E. 2d 197 (1983) Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations, 704 P. 2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985). The Illinois Supreme Court in Coney v. J. L. G. Industries, Inc. gave four reasons justifying the retention of joint and several liability (1) The feasibility of apportioning fault on a comparative basis does not render an in separable injury divisible for purposes of the joint and several liability rule. A concurrent tortfeasor is liable for the tout ensemble of an indivisible injury when his negligence is a proximate coif of that damage.In many instances, the negligence of a concurrent tortfeasor may be sufficient by itself to cause the entire loss. The mere fact that it may be possible to assign some percentage figure to the relative blameworthiness of one negligent defendant as compared to another does not in any way suggest that each defendants negligence is not a proximate cause of the entire indivisible injury. (2) In those instances where the plaintiff is not guilty of negligence, he would be forced to bear a portion of the loss should one of the tortfeasors prove financially unable to satisfy his share of the damages. 3) scour in cases where a plaintiff is part at fault, his culpability is not similar to that of a defendant. The plaintiffs negligence relates only to a lack of due care for his own base hit while the defendants negligence relates to a lack of due care for the safety of others the latter is tortious, but the former is not. (4) riddance of joint and several liability would invent a serious and unwarranted noxious effect on the ability of an injured plaintiff to obtain adequate honorarium for his injuries. Co ney, 97 Ill. 2d at 121-22, 73 Ill.Dec. at 345, 454 N. E. 2d at 205 (citations omitted). ***** plot recognizing the logic in Disneys position, we cannot say with induction that joint and several liability is an below the belt doctrine or that it should necessarily be eliminated upon the adoption of comparative negligence. In position of the public policy considerations bearing on the issue, this Court believes that the viability of the doctrine is a point which should best be decided by the legislature. Consequently, we approve the decision of the district court of appeal. It is so ordered.